Every email carries a sender address that anyone can type. Three records in your domain's DNS decide whether the receiving server believes it: SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Together they let Gmail, Microsoft 365 and every other provider check that a message claiming to come from your domain really did.

What each record does

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is a published list of the servers allowed to send mail for your domain. The receiving server compares the sending server against that list. If your mailbox provider, your invoicing system and your newsletter tool are not all on it, their mail fails.

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to each message. The matching public key sits in your DNS. A valid signature proves the message came from a system you authorised and was not altered on the way.

DMARC ties the two together. It says what the receiver should do when SPF and DKIM do not line up with the visible From address: nothing, quarantine the message, or reject it. It also asks receivers to send you reports, so you can see who is sending mail in your name.

What goes wrong without them

Without DMARC enforcement, anyone can send an invoice that appears to come from your finance team. Customers and suppliers see your domain in the From line and have no way to tell. It is a common first step in invoice fraud.

The reverse problem is just as costly. Gmail and Yahoo now require authentication from anyone sending in volume, and Microsoft applies the same pressure to its consumer mail. A quote that fails SPF and DKIM goes to spam, or is rejected with a bounce the sender may never read. The customer simply never hears from you.

How to roll out DMARC safely

Do not start at reject. A strict policy before you have found every legitimate sender will block your own invoices and newsletters.

Start with p=none. This changes nothing about delivery but turns on the reports. Read them for two to four weeks and list every system that sends as your domain: the mailbox provider, the accounting package, the website contact form, the CRM, the marketing tool. Add each to SPF and set up DKIM for it.

When the reports show only mail you recognise passing, move to p=quarantine, first with a percentage of mail and then with all of it. Failing messages go to spam. After a few more weeks without surprises, move to p=reject. That is the setting that stops spoofing outright.

For a small business the whole rollout, from the first report to reject, usually takes six to ten weeks. Most of that time is waiting for reports, not working.

Mistakes we see most often

Publishing a DMARC record with no reporting address, so nobody ever reads the results. Ending the SPF record with a hard fail before every sender is listed. Forgetting subdomains and parked domains: a domain you never send from should still publish DMARC at p=reject and an SPF record that allows no one. And leaving a third-party sender, such as a CRM or a booking system, sending as your domain without its own DKIM key.

Each of these takes minutes to fix. Left alone, you find out when a customer asks why your email looks suspicious.

Microsoft 365 notes

Microsoft 365 gives every new custom domain an SPF record to add, but DKIM signing for a custom domain is off until you switch it on. Until then, outgoing mail is signed only with the default onmicrosoft.com domain, which does not match your From address, so DMARC cannot pass on DKIM. In the Microsoft 365 security settings, open the DKIM page for the domain, publish the two CNAME records it gives you, then enable signing.

Keep one SPF record per domain. Two separate SPF records make both invalid. Add each new sender to the single record, and watch the limit of ten DNS lookups.

Check where you stand

You can see your domain's SPF, DKIM and DMARC settings in 20 seconds with our domain security check. It gives you a grade from A to F with the fix for each gap. If you want the records set up and monitored for you, that is part of our Cybersecurity service.